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Research on alarm calls has yielded rare glimpses into the minds of our closest relatives. A new study 
suggests that primates monitor the effect alarm calls have on others.
Published in Current biology 16, issue 4, R123-R125, 2006
which should be used for any reference to this work
1Most primates vocalise when
threatened by a predator. These
alarm signals, after the Old Italian
all’ arme (‘to arms’), have proved
particularly valuable tools for
examining cognitive processes in
non-human animals. While call
comprehension is relatively well
to several predators such as
eagles, leopards or pythons. When
monkeys hear another’s alarm
calls to a python, for instance, they
respond by scanning the
surrounding area for the snake
they assume is present [4]. Another
example is the West African Dianaresearched in primates, very little
is known about the social factors
that influence call production [1].
A new study [2] by Dutch
researchers has provided
unexpected findings of almost
Orwellian dimensions: When
threatened by a predator, male
Thomas langurs (Presbytis
thomasi) do not stop producing
alarm calls until every single other
group member has responded
with at least one alarm call. Males
thus seem to monitor the calling
behaviour of each group member
and keep track of who has and
who has not responded with
alarm calls.
Alarm calls have attracted the
attention of comparative
psychologists, particularly those
interested in the origins of
language and semantic signalling
[3]. The classic example is the
vervet monkey alarm call system,
in which individuals produce
acoustically distinct vocalisationsmonkey, which produces one type
of alarm call when encountering a
leopard, and another one when
faced with an eagle [5]. Most
importantly, these calls indicate
the biological class of the predator
and are not simple responses to
situational circumstances or
perceived threat [6].
In primates, the ontogenetic
process leading to the production
of acoustically different call types
is probably under strong genetic
control. Infant vervet monkeys
give eagle-like alarm calls to
numerous flying objects, including
storks and falling leaves. Only
with experience do they learn to
restrict call use to genuinely
dangerous raptors [7]. It appears
that primates innately
conceptualise the world along
particular criteria, and respond
with species-specific vocal
signals to them. Some
researchers have thus questioned
the relevance of primate alarm
calls for understanding language
evolution and human cognition [8].How could genetically determined
vocal behaviour be relevant for
understanding the origins of
language, a system based on
arbitrary and socially learned
vocal utterances?
The meaning of a term, it has
been argued, is nothing more than
its use [9]. In rainforests, the
primary habitat of many primate
species, primate biomass can
reach several hundred individuals
per square kilometre and, with
visual contact strictly limited,
vocalisations are the main mode
of communication. As a result,
primates mature in a rich world of
sound with countless
contingencies between
vocalisations and events. But to
what degree are primates capable
of taking advantage of the
surrounding semantic landscape?
There is good evidence that
primates not only behave
adaptively to other individuals’
alarm calls, but that they
understand something about the
causal structure of the events
responsible for the various vocal
signals produced by conspecifics
and other animals [10–14].
The most striking difference
between humans and other
primates lies in the production
abilities. Although non-human
primates can engage in vocal tract
filtering and produce acoustically
complex structures, not unlike
human vowels, they do not
normally proceed to assemble
them into larger, more complex
strings [15]. Like other primates,
humans produce a finite number
of innately determined sound
units, or ‘phones’, but they can
2freely assemble them into rapid
and complex sequences to form
syllables, words, and sentences.
This concatenation ability is at the
core of all languages, raw material
for vocal imitation and responsible
for the generation of an infinite
number of novel sequences.
Some interesting exceptions
need to be mentioned
nonetheless. Like other primates,
free-ranging male Campbell’s
monkeys (C. campbelli) produce
acoustically distinct alarm calls to
leopards and eagles. However, if
males encounter unspecific or
less threatening events, such as
sounds of a falling tree or fleeing
antelope, they produce a pair of
low sounding ‘booms’ before a
series of alarm calls. Nearby
recipients hardly respond to these
boom-introduced alarm calls, as if
the booms have altered the
semantic meaning of the
subsequent alarm calls from a
predator-specific label to more
general sign of disturbance [16].
Work on free-ranging putty-nosed
monkeys (C. nictitans) in Nigeria
has revealed related results. Here,
the males produce two basic
alarm call types, ‘hacks’ and
‘pyows’. Surprisingly, however,
these calls are not predator-
specific because males produce
them to both eagles and leopards.
Instead males concatenate the
two calls into longer sequences,
and some of them are highly
predator-specific. In this species,
it is the call sequence, and not the
individual call, that carries
meaning [17].
A largely neglected area of
research concerns the question of
whether primates take the
composition of their audience into
account and, related to that,
whether callers intentionally
inform each other about events
they have just witnessed (rather
than responding to the events
directly). Although primates are
clearly sensitive to the
composition of their audience
[18], they do not seem to take into
account each other’s mental
states. For example, mothers do
not adjust their alarm call
production depending on whether
their offspring is aware or still
ignorant of impending danger [19].
There is a distinct possibility thatnon-human primates referential
signalling thus takes place in a
remarkable state of mind-
blindness.
With their recent study, Wich
and de Vries [2] have opened a
new and unexpected way of
investigating audience effects. In
their field experiment, alarm calls
were elicited from free-ranging
Sumatran Thomas langurs with a
model tiger. The vocal responses
of twelve different groups were
analysed, all consisting of one
adult male and one to several
females with their offspring. The
authors noted that the males
differed in the number of calls
they produced to the predator
model. Males only stopped alarm
calling after each independent
individual in the group had given
at least one alarm call. The
authors also reported that, after
having heard the last individual’s
calls, the male sometimes
oriented towards that particular
group member in order to
produce a few more alarm calls,
as if he wished to acknowledge
to that animal that he had heard
the calls.
These findings were interpreted
as evidence of the males’ ability
to keep track and remember
which group members had and
had not given alarm calls. These
sorts of data have not been
reported from the wild before, and
the implications concerning the
mental representations potentially
involved are simply spectacular.
Exceptional claims require
exceptional evidence, and Wich
and de Vries [2] were careful in
addressing a number of
alternative explanations. First,
readers were assured that it was
possible to determine, with
confidence, which group
members had already produced
alarm calls at any given time.
Second, the authors ruled out the
most obvious alternative
explanation: that the data were a
mere artefact of males simply
responding to other group
members’ alarm calls. If all
individuals eventually gave alarm
calls, the outcome would have
been the same. This was not the
case, the authors argued,
because males sometimes
stopped calling before othergroup members produced their
last call.
Although the new paper [2] is
convincing as it stands,
experimental evidence will
eventually be required to further
establish the idea that males
actively monitor and manoeuvre
the calling behaviour of others.
The most straightforward way of
testing this would be to assess
the effects of experimentally
introduced alarm calls on the
males’ own calling behaviour. If
they authors are right, then
experimental calls of previously
silent individuals should have the
power to terminate the male’s
calling behaviour within a few
minutes, while calls of individuals
that had already called before
should have no effect, regardless
of numbers and quality. The
patterns of alarm calling
behaviour in all-male groups are
of some interest, as is the calling
behaviour of the group’s male in
cases when an individual is
temporarily removed from the
group. Will males simply call on
forever?
Wich and de Vries [2] offer
some explanations for the
function of this extraordinary
behaviour. Males play a crucial
role as sentinels, immediately
producing alarm calls to any
disturbance, to which other group
members respond with climbing
into the trees. The best response
to tigers is to remain off the
ground because they are unable
to pursue monkeys through the
canopy. Hence, the males’
primary objective may be to keep
others from descending to the
ground. Producing alarm calls
until every other group member
has done the same ensures the
male that everyone is aware of the
danger. Whether or not this is
based on an abstract
understanding of other’s
knowledge cannot be answered
with the data, but the system
certainly has the potential to
address this crucial question.
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